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Описание книги "Институты, институциональные изменения и функционирование экономики"
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Дуглас Норт — лауреат Нобелевской премии по эко-номике 1993 года. Его книга, выдержавшая как минимум 9 изданий на английском языке, является одной из осново¬полагающих работ в области институционально-эволюци¬онной теории. Здесь рассматривается роль институтов (за¬конов, соглашений, кодексов поведения и т. п.) в социаль¬но-экономическом развитии. Особую ценность для россий¬ского читателя имеет анализ влияния четко определенных и защищенных прав собственности на эффективный эко¬номический рост, а также зависимости развития экономи¬ки от исторически сложившейся институциональной сис¬темы. На русском языке книга публикуется впервые
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